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1. Introduction
This chapter analyses developments in FDI in the electronics industry in
five East Central European countries (the four Visegrad countries:
Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia; and Estonia) which represent
the overwhelming majority of total production in the Central and Eastern
European (CEE) region, with only Russia, of the region’s remaining
countries, also having a substantial share1. Furthermore, three Mediter -
ranean countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) are also included in the
analysis for comparative reasons. The main research question is whether
there are any new post-crisis trends and patterns in FDI and location
competition in the electronics industry compared to the pre-crisis period.
In the analysis, simple statistical methods and various statistical data are
used, given the limited availability of and problems surrounding FDI data.
The chapter shows that the five CEE countries became important locations
of the electronics industry, especially from a European perspective,
through an FDI-based, ongoing restructuring of the industry. Thus the
dominant producers are local subsidiaries of foreign-owned multinational
companies, which were even able to gain in terms of their relative country-
level shares of production, employment, value added or R&D during the
crisis, indicating the higher vulnerability of domestically-owned
companies compared to their foreign-owned counterparts. During the
crisis, the five CEE countries were able to gain in terms of their shares in
European electronics FDI, production, and to a lesser extent in value
added, and most probably were able to slightly decrease their dependence
on imported inputs. At the same time, the Mediterranean countries
basically stagnated in all areas, due less to the increase in the CEE shares
and more to larger shares of certain ‘old’ EU Member States, especially
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1. Reed Electronics Research, August 2013.
Germany, in European production and value added. Thus the
restructuring of European electronics production progressed further
during the crisis years and changed to some extent direction, reflecting
the changes in the competitiveness of individual EU Member States and
their differing specialisation in the various, heterogeneous segments of
the electronics industry. This latter aspect is boosted by the fact that even
inside the CEE group of countries developments differ slightly at country
level. Overall, if we assume the continuation of the during- and post-crisis
trends, a further increase in the importance of the CEE countries analysed
(and even other countries in the CEE region) can be expected in the
European electronics industry.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the main characteristics and
pre-crisis developments of the industry are presented, followed by a
section on data, data problems and methodology. FDI data are then
looked at, supplemented by an analysis of other data on foreign-owned
companies, output, value added, employment and exports. Outward FDI
(OFDI) and relocations are examined in the penultimate section, while
the last section concludes. 
2. Pre-crisis trends in the electronics industry with
specific regard to the CEE
The electronics manufacturing (and related services) has been one of the
main drivers of globalisation, being one of the most integrated industries
in global terms and with exceedingly strong links to other industries and
sectors. It contributes significantly to economic development and growth,
directly and indirectly, through improving productivity in other sectors.
The industry is characterised by an increasingly fragmented production
process, with individual activities transferred to those locations where
they can be carried out at lower costs and/or more efficiently (OECD
2004; UNCTAD 2004). A further interesting feature is the heterogeneity
of products belonging to it.2 These are very heterogeneous in terms of
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2. For example, Decision (2009) categorised electronics products by application sector in the
following product groups: Audio and video; Home appliances; Data processing; Telecom;
Aerospace and defence; Automotive; Industry and Medical. Custer Consulting Group (2013)
listed the following market segments: inside the Volume group (the production of which is
shifted to low cost areas): Computers and mobile communication devices; Other consumer
electronics; Datacom, telecom; and Automotive, and inside the ‘Protected’ group: Military;
Medical; Instruments and controls; High IP Content.
their factor intensity, level of innovation, R&D intensity, the availability
of economies of scale, specific transport costs, importance of the speed
of response to changes in market demand, etc. Thus their levels of
fragmentation, tendency to relocation and the acceptable distance
between the host/producing country and the market differ to a great
extent. 
The industry is very sensitive to business cycles. It is vulnerable to global
recessions, not only directly but also indirectly, and on account of its
strong links with other industries (e.g. the automotive industry or
computer-aided production systems in other sectors). Because of this,
electronics was one of the industries hardest hit by the crisis, with the
focus being heightened on economies of scale, productivity and cost
reductions. This resulted in a restructuring process featuring increased
merger and acquisition (M&A) and relocation activities in the companies
affected. Different regional specialisations throughout the world
explained the divergence between pre-crisis growth rates. While Asia was
relatively specialised in mass-market products, Europe focused more on
the production of professional and automotive electronic equipment.
European shares in global production were high especially in the
industrial, aerospace and defence, automotive and medical application
sectors before the crisis. (DECISION 2009: 11)
The analysed CEE countries emerged as new locations for the global
electronics industry after 1990. Prior to 1990, their electronics industries
lagged considerably behind those of developed countries and were to a
great extent dependent on foreign technology (Radosevic 2005). All
countries participated in the CMEA division of labour in electronics, and
thus had substantial capacities. Production was concentrated in large
conglomerates and had strong ties with the military sector. Of these large
conglomerates, the only one to survive was the Hungarian Videoton, on
the basis of an innovative strategy and alliances with large multinationals
(Radosevic and Yoruk 2001 and see Box 2 for details). The others were
mostly cut up into smaller units and privatised or liquidated (Szanyi
2006). However, the industry’s relatively well-developed human capital
and expertise remained in place. The mid-1990s saw the start of a revival
and quick expansion of the industry in the countries analysed, based
mainly on the establishment of new production facilities by foreign
multinational companies. In doing so, they have become active
participants in the ever-increasing and extensive globalisation of the
electronics industry. This FDI-based revival started at different times in
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the countries analysed (Linden 1998; Radosevic 2005; Szanyi 2006; Sass
and Szanyi 2012). Hungary was the first to open up its economy to FDI,
including electronics investments. The special regulation of industrial
free trade zones was especially attractive for large, greenfield projects
assembling mainly imported inputs for export, using relatively cheap
local unskilled or semi-skilled labour – thus attracting certain segments
of the electronics manufacturing industry to the country (See e.g.
Antalóczy and Sass 2001). Czechia offered substantial incentives to
(among others) electronics projects starting in around 1998, while Poland
and Slovakia caught up later. Overall, incentives for FDI projects in the
electronics industry have been considerable in CEE countries (see e.g.
Drahokoupil 2009). As a result of these developments, by 2003 the
production of Hungary, Czechia and Poland exceeded that of Mexico,
though was still considerably less than that of the East Asian economies
and lower than that of Ireland. The three aforementioned CEE countries
had a diversified production structure with substantial capacities for
basically all segments of the IT manufacturing industry. However, their
exports were less diversified in terms of the industry’s sub-segments,
consisting mainly of computers, parts and components and consumer
electronics, and indicative of the persisting technological backwardness
of the analysed countries. By 2001, Hungary and Czechia were by far the
biggest exporters in absolute terms, as well as being the countries with
the highest export intensity (export/production) (Radosevic 2005: 6). In
all four Visegrad countries, subsidiaries of foreign multinationals (with
the exception of a few, usually smaller-sized locally-owned companies)
dominated the industry, with a high integration in global value chains –
of which the high export intensity was one indication (see e.g. Kaminsky
and Ng (2001) or Sass and Szalavetz (2013) for a statistical analysis,
Deutsche Bank (2014) shows that the Visegrad countries are very well
integrated in European (EU-15) value chains3). It is important to note
that, compared to other industries’ (agriculture, apparel or automotive)
global value chains, the labour component of IT hardware points to a
relatively higher share of knowledge-intensive and high-skilled
technology-intensive work, at the expense of moderately or low-skilled
labour-intensive activities (Barrientos et al. 2010: 11) thus in principle
offers plenty of upgrading opportunities for the countries involved.
Indeed, there were signs of upgrading in the operating structures of
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3. Deutsche Bank (2014) shows that besides Vehicles, Telecom and Electrical Machinery are
the most important export goods of the Visegrad countries and Estonia, and that all of them
have a comparative advantage in the production of electrical equipment.
foreign-owned electronics companies and increasing local value added
in the Visegrad countries (Szalavetz 2004; Sass and Szalavetz 2013). 
Furthermore, the FDI-based integration in global value chains (GVCs)
went hand-in-hand with considerable technology transfer, one indication
of which is the changes in the (revealed) comparative advantages of the
analysed countries (IMF 2013; Rahman and Zhao 2013). This
development came together with a one-sided specialisa tion of the
analysed countries (Galgóczi 2009) through efficiency-seeking FDI,
making them vulnerable to external shocks, an indication of which was
the considerable fall in production levels during the crisis. 
Besides substantial relocations targeting the CEE region, (Hunya and Sass
2005) a few substantial relocations during that period had already
highlighted the sector’s high concentration and low locational loyalty and
its vulnerability to changes in the demand structure and relative wages
(UNCTAD 2003)4. The parallel emergence of competitive foreign
locations offering enormous amounts of cheap labour, especially in Asia,
has also been shaping European developments, to a much greater extent
than in other industries as electronics is relatively more rootless
(Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck 2010; Dicken 2011). Against this
background the crisis emerged, hitting electronics very hard. 
3. Data and methodology
On account of data availability, electronics is defined in this paper as
covering categories C26 (manufacture of computer, electronic and optical
products) and C27 (manufacture of electrical equipment) in accordance
with NACE rev. 2 (2008). In principle, FDI sector statistics are available
in this breakdown, but, presumably for confidentiality reasons, Eurostat
and certain national banks do not provide data on FDI in C27
(equipment). This is only available together with data on five other
manufacturing sub-industries (C15, C23, C31, C32 and C335). The national
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4. For example, the transfer of the production of IBM Storage Products from Székesfehérvár,
Hungary to China in 2003 resulted in a loss of more than five thousand jobs (including
agency workers), and to a substantial decrease in production and exports for Hungary.
5. C15: Manufacture of leather and related products, C23: Manufacture of other non-metallic
mineral products, C31: Manufacture of furniture, C32: Other manufacturing, C33: Repair
and installation of machinery and equipment.
banks of the analysed countries follow different practices. While the Czech
and Polish national banks publish grouped data, no data has been
published in Slovakia for the years after 2009. Estonia publishes
aggregated data for total manufacturing. The Hungarian National Bank
is the only one publishing separate data for C27 (equipment).
Furthermore, Eurostat provides FDI data solely for the period starting
with 2008 and with data missing for certain countries for the overall
period or for certain years. This problem significantly affects the use of
FDI data. The magnitude of the problem may be seen in the case of
Hungary, the only country among the analysed ones for which we have
separate FDI data for C27 (equipment). In Hungary, the FDI stock at the
end of 2012 amounted to 2,275.3 million euros in C26 (products), and to
670.6 million euros in C27 (equipment). Adding the second figure to the
first increases the stock of electronics FDI by almost 30%.
That hiatus in FDI data and the problems of FDI stock and flow data for
measuring the size of foreign-owned activity (Lipsey 2006) are dealt with
here by supplementing the analysis with output, gross value added and
related data of the electronics sub-industries, available from Eurostat for
all the analysed sub-industries and for a considerably longer period of
time. Another data source on the shares of foreign-owned companies in
the analysed countries is published by the OECD.6 The use of this data is
all the more justified, as Lipsey (2006) notes that the balance of payments
and national accounts data are only rough indicators of the extent of FDI,
and are especially weak in measuring changes over time.
Though foreign trade data may provide a good indication of the role of a
given country in the European and international division of labour and
of its changes over time, these data refer to gross export and import
values without showing local value added. In this field, the data on trade
in value added calculated by the OECD and WTO can be used as an
indication of the extent of local added value and any changes therein.
However, these data are only available until 2009.
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6. These data are not available for Greece.
Besides the above-listed data problems, missing data for one or more of
the analysed countries and for one or more years add to analysis
difficulties. These problems are handled here through using multiple data
sources and trying to put together the jigsaw puzzle of developments in
the analysed industry. Furthermore, this is the reason for using only
simple statistical indicators.
FDI trends and patterns in electronics
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Box 1 Data problems
A short note on data problems is important before delving into the analysis of available
statistics. The first problem arises when we want to analyse the home country distribution
of FDI in electronics. Large and especially non-EU multinationals usually realise their
investment projects through one of their subsidiaries for various reasons. Cost minimisation
(tax optimisation) plays a role when a tax haven (e.g. Cayman Islands) or a country with
advantageous fiscal regulations (e.g. the Netherlands or, in certain industries, Ireland) is
‘inserted’ between the ultimate owner and the investment project. An ‘intermediary’
subsidiary can be used for other purposes as well: for example when a regional or European
centre manages other subsidiaries on the continent, when the ‘intermediary’ subsidiary has
in-depth knowledge of or close contacts with the final destination of the investment, etc.
(Kalotay 2012). As shown by developments in Hungary, the use of ‘intermediary’
subsidiaries became more frequent during and after the crisis (Antalóczy and Sass 2014).
Table 1 shows, that in the case of the top 13 foreign electronics investors (and the top
locally-owned company) in Hungary in 2012, the final owner’s home country is the same
as that of the immediate/direct owner in only four cases (and partially in one case). The
same problem may arise in the case of the industry affiliation of electronics investment.
The most obvious case is that of certain multinationals in the automotive sector with
electronics activities (supplying electronic parts and components for vehicles) but registered
under the category ‘Transport equipment’. Furthermore, certain multinationals manage
their local production units under a local service management unit which acts as the owner.
In such a case, FDI is realised and registered under ‘Business services’ while the activity
actually carried out is for the most part electronics. That may also affect output and gross
value added data. The above problems teach us to be cautious about the available macro
data.
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Table 1 Top companies in electronics in Hungary (2012) 
Name of the
company
Samsung
Electronics
Flextronics
International
Nokia Komárom
PCE Paragon
Solutions
Jabil Circuit
Hungary
National
Instruments
Hungary
GE*
Philips***
Siemens*
Sanmina-SCI**
(data for 3
subsidiaries)
FIH Europe
IBM
(4 subsidiaries)
NXP Semiconduc -
tors (formerly
part of Philips)
Videoton*
(25 member
companies)
Nationality
of final
owner
Korean
Singapore/
US
Finnish
Taiwanese
US
US
US
Dutch
German
US
Taiwanese
US
Dutch
Hungarian
Sales
(million
HUF)
713,517
511,215
394,376
379,430
342,333
265,260
(1,395,908)
electronics:
lighting,
e.industry,
healthcare,
aviation:
208,852 
157,920
79,694
4,548+
44,033+0
8,318
71,558
2,443
98,135
Export/
sales (%)
90.5%
91.0%
95.5%
98.5%
99.6%
99.7%
98%
95.3%
45.7%
96%;
99.9%; -
3.9%
79.3%
(including
services
export)
99.8%
58.6%
Number of
white-collar
employees
969
3,342
1,085 
347
538 
655
3,169
44
814
145+687+0
=832
79
total: 3,978
150
total: 7,052
Number of
blue-collar
employees
712
4,847
1,706
320
4032
490
5,912
46
548
329+415+0
=744
43
0
Nationality of
direct owner
Korean
Austrian
Finnish
Cayman
Islands
Dutch,
Luxemburgish,
Scottish 
Dutch
Hungarian
Dutch
Austrian
Dutch/US/
Dutch
Hong Kong
Irish, Dutch
Dutch
Hungarian
Note: direct owner: the nationality of the company which actually made the investment; final owner: the nation -
ality of the final/ultimate owner company. – * ‘Holding-type’ organisation, with various activities including
electronics – ** Most probably in the process of reorganising into a holding – *** Under liquidation in 2013
Source: HVG (Hungarian economic weekly), company balance sheets
4. FDI trends in electronics
Available data indicate a relatively low share of the five analysed countries
in EU27 FDI as well as a small increase in this share during the crisis,
indicating some limited changes in the European distribution of labour
based on FDI data.
As already mentioned, FDI data are available only for one electronics sub-
industry of the two: C26 (products). Inward FDI stock data are relatively
substantial in the analysed countries in this sub-industry (cf. Figure 1).
Seen in relation to country size (in terms of population or GDP), Hungary
and Slovakia stand out as FDI recipients. Overall however, FDI stock
decreased throughout the crisis, except in Estonia and Hungary. 
Overall, the combined share of the five CEE countries in 2010 in total
EU27 C26 FDI stock is only slightly more than 3% – a very low percentage
(Table 2). Poland and Hungary had the highest shares, each with around
1%. Larger shares can be arrived at through simply adding up CEE
country data in the industry7, but even then the CEE share is still only
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Figure 1 Inward FDI stock in the manufacture of computer, electronic
and optical products (C26), 2008-11, million euros
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data. Note: data are missing for Greece and Portugal,
and for Poland for 2008 and 2009
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Czechia Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia Spain
2008 2009 2010 2011
7. In Eurostat, EU27 data are considerably higher for 2008, 2009 and 2010 than the simple
sum of member country data. Country shares for 2011: Czechia: 1.4%; Estonia: 0.3%, Spain:
2%; Hungary: 3.2%; Poland: 3.3%, Slovakia: 1.2%.
9.4%. However, EU27 FDI stock in this industry is dominated by the UK
(32.7%), Ireland (11.3%), Germany and the Netherlands (9.9% each),
France (6.4%) and Finland (5.5%). Thus, the combined CEE share is
similar to that of Germany (or the Netherlands), but is considerably lower
than that of the UK or Ireland. 
Investor countries differ for the analysed economies, though EU home
countries dominate everywhere, according to Eurostat data.8 Basically all
C26 FDI stock in Estonia originates from the EU27. That share is similarly
high in Spain (fluctuating between 70 and 80%), lower in Czechia and
Hungary (between 50 and 60%), and even lower in Poland and Slovakia
(below 50%). The share of the New Member States is substantial only in
Slovakia (mainly due to certain Hungarian investments there, partly
connected to foreign-owned subsidiaries (e.g. Samsung) investing
through their Hungarian subsidiaries in Slovakia, and partly due to
‘original’ Hungarian FDI). The stock of German and Dutch FDI in the
analysed industry exceeds 100 million euros in each of the four Visegrad
countries. France is an important investor in Spain, while Austria is an
important one in Hungary (partly due to indirect investments by the
German Siemens and the US/Singaporean Flextronics, investing in
Hungary through their Austrian subsidiaries (Table 1)). Until recently,
Finland was an important investor in Hungary (Nokia). Sweden is one of
the leading investor countries in Estonia (almost exclusively) and in
Poland. The UK is an important investor in Spain, and has some relatively
substantial investments in Czechia and Slovakia. From outside the EU-
27, in 2011 China was an important investor in Poland; Hong Kong and
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Table 2 Share in EU total IFDI stock in the manufacture of computer,
electronic and optical products (C26), 2008-10, (%)
Czechia 
Estonia
Spain
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
2008
0.58
0.04
0.67
0.99
n.d.
0.30
2009
0.60
0.02
0.73
0.80
n.d.
0.67
2010
0.45
0.09
0.66
0.89
1.09
0.59
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data 
8. Due to the reasons discussed in the section on data problems, data on home countries must
be handled with care. Eurostat data on investor countries are available until 2011.
Japan in Hungary and Poland; South Korea (Samsung) in Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia; and Taiwan (Foxconn) in Czechia.
The share of electronics in total FDI is low: in CEE it ranges from 1%
(Czechia) to 3.3% (Slovakia), and seems to be lower in the Mediterranean
countries (Spain: 0.3%). In the analysed country group, Hungary and
Slovakia are the only countries where that share exceeds the EU-27 average
(2.3%).9 The latter may point to the fact that more footloose capacities (i.e.
with lower invested amounts and thus sunk costs10) were transferred to the
CEE countries. Separately collected data on relocations also show how this
movement of capacities has added to existing capacities in the CEE
countries. In a previous paper (Hunya, Sass 2005) we showed that in the
FDI literature, relocation is identified as efficiency-seeking or vertically
integrated FDI, as opposed to market-seeking or horizontally integrated
FDI. However, FDI statistics are not able to grasp the whole extent of
relocation, offshoring and offshore outsourcing. For the pre-crisis period,
on the basis of the data of the European Restructuring Monitor we showed
that in 2005 a large number of relocation projects transferred capacities to
the CEE countries, resulting in substantial job creation in the NMS-8, mainly
in the electronics and automotive industries, and job losses in Germany. But
based on the available information one cannot find any link between the
two processes. We later analysed Hungary separately for the period 2003 -
2011, finding out that electronics – together and interlinked with the
automotive industry – was the most important sector for relocations, both
to and from Hungary, in the period 2003 - 2011 (Sass and Hunya 2014). In
another paper (Sass and Szanyi 2012) we analysed relocations in the
electronics sector in Hungary for the period 2003 - 2010, finding out that
on the basis of the number of cases electronics relocations were more
frequent in the crisis period. We also found that it is usually Western
European locations (mainly Germany) which are affected (i.e. capacities are
transferred from there to Hungary), and that not only Western European
multinationals are moving their capacities: many US, Japanese and other
East-Asian companies relocated electronics activities to Hungary.11 While
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9. Calculations based on Eurostat data.
10. We assume the relatively low invested amounts on the basis of comparing FDI and the
output/production data. A similar conclusion is drawn on the basis of detailed data provided
by the Deutsche Bundesbank on total assets per employee of German FDI in CEE and other
countries in 2003 by Lipsey (2006).
11. We saw relocations inter alia by the US IBM, Jabil, National Instruments, Delphi and
Sanimna-SCI, the Dutch Philips, the German Continental, Epcos, Zeiss and Robert Bosch,
the French Kontavill and Schneider Electric, the Japanese Clarion and Sanyo, the Korean
Samsung and the Finnish Elcoteq.
relocation is basically an intra-European phenomenon in terms of the
locations affected at both ends, compared to other industries, non-EU
locations are more frequently involved. Interestingly enough, among the
foreign locations affected, there was only one case where the source country
was one of the analysed Mediterranean countries (Spain) out of 48 cases of
relocations to Hungary for the period 2003 - 2010 (Sass and Szanyi 2012).
Furthermore, there were only a few cases of backshoring during the crisis,
with activities previously relocated away from Hungary to other (mainly
Asian) countries being moved back. On the basis of the analysis of the
Hungarian case we found that the employment impact of electronics
relocations is possibly the highest among all industries, possibly pointing to
the relatively labour-intensive nature of the activities involved. As the
presence of backshoring indicates, there are relocation cases where
multinational companies transfer activities away from the analysed
countries. In the case of Hungary, in Hunya and Sass (2014) we identified
various instances of relocations of the Hungarian subsidiaries of
multinational companies away from Hungary in the period 2003 – 2011,
with the highest number of cases (13 of the total 42) in the electronics
industry. Six of these involved relocations to China and were usually
relatively large projects causing a high number of job losses in Hungary. For
example, the most recent relocation in 2014 was by Nokia, which closed its
Komárom plant (opened in 2000) after the business line in question
(production of mobile phones) was acquired by Microsoft. The shutdown of
the factory resulted in the dismissal of 1800 workers and production being
moved to Asia. In terms of their distribution over time, there is no clear-cut
pattern concerning the pre-crisis and post-crisis numbers of relocations
from Hungary, possibly due to their overall low number. We suspect that
relocations to and from other CEE countries may be similar in terms of
frequency and magnitude.12
The role of the state has already been underlined in terms of attracting
FDI, among others in electronics, through offering generous incentives
to investing firms. As far as developments during the crisis are concerned,
they are much less documented. An analysis by Paul et al. (2014) of the
New Members States of the EU shows that a composite index, evaluating
infrastructure, quality of institutions, labour market and taxation from
the point of view of FDI, declined in all CEE countries except Poland
between 2007 and 2010, mainly due to a reduction in tax competitiveness.
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12. Furthermore, we found a few cases (though not in electronics), when the concentration of
capacities results in relocations from one CEE country to another.
A more detailed analysis is yet to be undertaken on post-crisis FDI
promotion in the analysed countries. 
5. Foreign-owned companies in electronics
Market players can be grouped into three categories in all the analysed
CEE countries. The first, most important group from the point of view of
production or export is that of large-sized foreign-owned companies.
Subsidiaries of foreign multinationals form two sub-groups: (i) ones with
their own brands, and (ii) OEMs (original equipment manufacturers),
EMSs (electronics manufacturing services) or ECMs (electronic contract
manufacturers). Locally owned large-sized companies belong to the
second group and may function as OEMs, EMSs, ECMs and/or as
integrator companies supplied by smaller, locally owned companies. A
third group consists of small and medium-sized companies, both foreign-
and locally-owned, which are usually suppliers of the local or
geographically close subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, in many cases
with the mediation of a company from the first or second group.
According to the literature, the share of foreign-owned subsidiaries has
played a dominant role in all the analysed countries.13
The OECD publishes statistics on the share of foreign-owned subsidiaries
in various sectors and industries. Compared to the FDI data discussed in
the previous section, the time series here are longer, available for more
countries and for both electronics sub-industries. The indicators show
that foreign-owned companies play either an important (Mediterranean
countries) or a dominant (Visegrad countries and Estonia) role. These
data also give a further indication of changes during the crisis years
(Table 3).
First of all, it should be noted that in all the analysed countries the
industry is dominated by a few large subsidiaries of multinational
companies, while domestically owned firms are usually of much smaller
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13. In Czechia (Guimón 2013); the list of major investors in Czechia contains numerous
electronics firms (CzechInvest 2008). In Estonia, ‘The sector is strongly orientated towards
foreign markets as most of the large companies are foreign-capital owned’.
http://www.tradewithestonia.com/exporters-db/sector/18/electronics-and-optics, or see
Tiits and Kalvet (2012). For Hungary see Plank and Staritz (2013) or Sass (2013), for Poland:
Woodward (2005) or Garbacz (2010). For Slovakia: http://www.sario.sk/sites/default/files/
content/files/electrotechnical_industry.pdf
size in terms of the number of employees and/or production values.
Though the number of foreign-owned companies is usually very low
compared to the total number of companies14, they are responsible for the
bulk of employment and especially of production, value added and R&D.
Foreign-owned companies represent the overwhelming majority of
electronics production and value added in the five CEE countries, and
they are the largest employers in Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia.
Concerning the qualitative aspects of employment Plank and Staritz
(2013) analyse whether economic and social upgrading has occurred
through the increased involvement and integration of Hungary (and
Romania) into global production networks in the electronics industry.
They show that the activities in the electronics industry in the analysed
countries are still mainly of a labour-intensive nature where the majority
of work can be performed by un-/semi-skilled workers. Work practices
in the sector are neo-Taylorist, featuring very flexible employment
regulations and direct control regimes with the consequence that working
conditions differ from those in Western Europe: they ‘are characterized
by a polarized workforce, relatively low wages with a high variable share,
flexible working time arrangements and precarious employment
relationships, as well as hostility towards trade unions. The social
upgrading experiences in Hungarian and Romanian electronics plants
shed a differentiated light on the socioeconomic impact of “high-tech”
industries’ (Plank and Staritz 2013: 19). The uniform nature of these
developments in Hungary and Romania may indicate that in the other
analysed countries, FDI-based integration into global production
networks or global value chains may result in similar problems.
Foreign-owned subsidiaries are the most important sources of R&D in
electronics in the CEE countries, except to a certain extent in Poland, the
country with the lowest absolute values of ICT R&D expenditure and
personnel amongst the countries analysed. On the other hand, in Hungary
electronics R&D is carried out almost exclusively by foreign-owned
companies. Various studies indicate the increasing though still minor
importance of the CEE countries for foreign R&D activities. Back in 2005,
Kalotay (2005) already noted the emerging importance of the CEE
countries for R&D investments, emphasizing that mainly European
multinational companies in the automotive and electronics industries
were locating R&D facilities in Czechia, Hungary and Poland. There are
currently several studies underway to investigate the possibility of
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14. The exception is Estonia, where the total number of electronics companies is very low.
relocating R&D activities to CEE countries with considerable production
capacities in the given industry. This is also true for the electronics sector.
While the search for knowledge as a driver of R&D FDI in CEE is still of
secondary importance, there are signs that this has changed to some
extent recently (Gauselmann et al. 2011; Sass 2013). Gauselmann (2013)
has shown that CEE sub-regions are seemingly catching up as target
locations for knowledge and technology sourcing of MNEs, and the factors
determining the location choices are increasingly similar to those in
developed economies, indicating the region’s emergence as a competitor
to Western European and Mediterranean R&D locations. Further
important findings concern the actual content of R&D: Rugraff (2014)
analysed foreign direct R&D investment in Central Europe (Visegrad
countries) and based on a detailed analysis of the Czech electronics,
electrical equipment, machinery and automotive industries found that it
continued to be mainly in support of production and associated with the
international exploitation of technology produced in Western
headquarters and subsidiaries. His results are all the more important as
Czechia was the Central European leader in foreign direct R&D
investments and the Czech government led the region in promoting
foreign R&D investment. In Sass (2013), I have analysed the R&D
activities of Hungarian subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies
in the automotive and electronics industries. On the basis of case studies,
I found great diversity in terms of subsidiaries’ R&D activities, ranging
from simple testing to fundamental research. The knowledge-seeking
motive, though still minor, is increasingly present in locating R&D
activities to Hungary. In Sass and Hunya (2014) we also noted the increase
in the number of R&D relocations, including electronics manufacturing
and services, especially after 2008, which may be related to the crisis-
related strengthening of the efficiency-seeking and cost-reduction motive
of the Western European companies concerned.
The structure of the industry differs somewhat in the two Mediterranean
countries from that of the CEE countries, with the share of foreign-owned
companies in all areas being smaller (except for their size), indicating a
stronger locally-owned production base (Table 3).
As far as developments during the crisis are concerned, the data in Table
3 indicate that the share of foreign-owned companies in the total number
has grown in all countries except Slovakia, indicating that the crisis
affected local companies much more seriously than foreign-owned ones
– resulting in some of them disappearing. The share of foreign-owned
FDI trends and patterns in electronics
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companies in employment, production and value added also grew in most
cases, also indicating that locally-owned companies were losing ground
to foreign-owned ones. 
6. Other indirect measurements of FDI trends
In this section, data providing information on changes to the European
distribution of production in electronics and possible developments in
local value added are analysed, i.e. changes in the level of integration of
the analysed countries into the European distribution of production,
providing indirect information about FDI in the sector. We start by
analysing output, value added and employment, before looking at data
on net exports.
7. Developments in output
Output and value added trends, partly due to the dominant or important
role played by foreign-owned subsidiaries, provide indications of shifts
in the European division of labour. Electronics production has increased
in the Visegrad countries and Estonia, while stagnating or decreasing in
the Mediterranean countries. However, the relationship between these
two trends is not as straightforward as it seems. 
Eurostat national accounts data provide information on the two
electronics sub-industries (C26 and C27) at both country and European
level, allowing us to see how production output and value added data have
evolved in absolute terms and in terms of the given country’s share in the
EU27 for a longer period of time, i.e. 2000 – 2012. This period includes
the crisis years more fully than the previous data.
Combining the data on the two sub-industries (Figure 2), we see clearly
that output in the five CEE countries increased substantially in the period
analysed, with a short break during the crisis, especially in 2009. Looking
at the Mediterranean countries for the same period, output stagnated in
Greece and Portugal, while in Spain it increased substantially until the
crisis, only to decrease in the post-crisis period. Even so, Spain was the
largest producer in 2011 among the analysed countries, followed neck
and neck by Czechia, Hungary and Poland. 
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Figure 2 Combined C26 and C27 output in the analysed countries,
2000-2012, (million euros)
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Figure 3 Share of the analysed countries in the EU-27’s total C26
and C27 output, 2000-2011 (%) 
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat national accounts data (NACE classification) 
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The above statements are reinforced by Figure 3: while Spain still had
the largest share in EU27 production in 2011, it had declined steeply to
the levels progressively attained by Czechia, Hungary and Poland.
Slovakia’s electronics output was less dynamic, while the shares of
Portugal and Greece remained basically stagnant. While the total share
of the Mediterranean countries was between 6 and 7% until 2009, it then
declined to below 5.5%; in the same period that of the five CEE countries
grew from 4.8% in 2000 to almost 12% in 2008 and 2009 and to 12.6%
in 2011. In terms of the breakdown of EU27 electronics output, there was
thus a considerable shift away from the Mediterranean countries during
the crisis to other countries, including the five CEE economies. 
Changes in the shares of the individual Member States in the total
electronics output of the EU27 (Figure 4) show interesting developments,
putting the relative gains and losses of the analysed CEE and Mediter -
ranean countries into another perspective.
The relative losses in the shares of the Mediterranean countries result
only to a lesser extent from the gains of the five CEE countries. Germany
and Austria alone gained by far more during the crisis period than these
CEE economies.15 Thus the relative losses in shares in EU output of the
Mediterranean countries can be attributed to two developments:
increases in the shares in the CEE countries, and to a greater extent,
increases in the shares of certain ‘old’ EU Member States. This indicates
significant divergences in the relative competitiveness of EU Member
States, ‘old’ and ‘new’ alike, in the electronics industry.
However, developments differ to a great extent in the two sub-industries.
With regard to C26 (products) (cf. Appendix Figure 1), output grew
dynamically in all the analysed CEE countries, while decreasing in the
three Mediterranean economies. This momentum came to a halt in the
crisis years, and even saw a decrease in 2010. Hungary became the largest
producer, replacing Spain in 2005. The total share of the eight analysed
countries in EU27 output grew from 9% in 2000 to 19% in 2011, clearly
led by the gains of the CEE economies (from below 5% to 16%). On the
other hand, in the other sub-industry, C27 (equip ment) (cf. Appendix
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15. Other ‘during-crisis winners’ include Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. It is interesting to
note that in the case of these countries, with the exception of Austria, relative shares in EU
output had been continuously declining in the pre-crisis period, while quite substantially
increasing after 2007.
Figure 2), a dynamic increase characterised Czechia, Estonia, Poland,
Portugal and Slovakia, which was to some extent broken by the crisis, but
recovered soon afterwards. On the other hand, in Greece, Spain and
Hungary, the crisis had a lasting negative impact on output. Even so,
Spain was the largest producer among the analysed countries in 2012,
followed by Poland and Czechia. The share of the eight countries in EU27
total output went up from 13 to just 17%, while the share of the CEE
countries exceeded that of the Mediterranean countries only from the
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Figure 4 Shares of the EU Member States in total EU C26 and C27 output;
2000, 2004, 2007 and 2011 (%) 
Note: without Luxemburg, Malta (2000, 2004, 2007 and 2011) and Latvia (2011).
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat national accounts data (NACE classification)
crisis years onwards. In this sub-industry, the shift was thus much less
spectacular. This can be partly attributed to the fact that in the C27
category, lower growth was expected for the EU as a whole compared to
the world and Asia (Custer Consulting Group 2013), mainly due to the
decline in telecom production, in which Europe has become increasingly
de-specialised. Differences in relative specialisations thus caused
different during-crisis changes at country level. 
8. Developments in value added
Data on value added provide a somehow different picture (Figure 5). The
dynamism characterising developments in output is much less present
in the development of gross value added, especially for Hungary and
Slovakia. As regards Spain, stagnation turned into a decrease during the
crisis years, while in Greece, output stagnation has been coupled with a
decrease in value added. In the case of Poland, the crisis had a lasting
negative impact on value added. It would thus seem that for the most part
capacities linked to production with lower value added have been shifted
within Europe.
As regards the shares of the analysed countries in EU27 electronics value
added (cf. Figure 6), Spain remains in pole position, even though its share
has been decreasing since 2009, taken up mainly by Czechia. Poland’s
and Hungary’s shares have also considerably decreased, in particular
during the crisis.
In terms of the share of the eight countries in the EU27 total, this grew
from 8% in 2000 to almost 13% in 2008, before declining somewhat
during the crisis. While the Mediterranean countries were characterised
by a stagnant share between 5 and 6%, that of the analysed CEE countries
grew to almost 7%, though also with some stagnant periods. Thus in value
added, the shift away from the Mediterranean countries towards other
countries including the CEE economies was much less pronounced, with
stagnation characterising the three Mediterranean countries and small
gains the CEE countries. 
Looking at the country breakdown of total EU value added (cf. Figure 7)
in the analysed period and also during the crisis years, gains characterise
the five CEE countries, except for Hungary, and stagnation the
Mediterranean countries. However, certain ‘old’ EU Member States
FDI trends and patterns in electronics
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Figure 5 Gross value added of C26 and C27 in the analysed countries,
2000-2012 (million euros)
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Figure 6 Share of the analysed countries in the EU27 gross value added
of C26 and C27, 2000-2011 (%)
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat national accounts data (NACE classification)
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gained shares, especially during the crisis years. Here again, the relative
gains of the CEE countries are far surpassed by the percentage point gains
of Germany alone, indicating that shifts amongst the ‘old’ EU-countries
were again more significant. One possible explanation for this is that
electronics activities characterised by higher added values were retained
by and even moved back to certain ‘old’ EU countries presumably with a
higher level of competitiveness in the area in question.
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Figure 7 Share of the EU Member States in total EU value added for C26
and C27, 2000, 2004, 2007 and 2011 (%) 
Note: without Luxemburg, Malta (2000, 2004, 2007 and 2011) and Latvia (2011).
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat national accounts data (NACE classification)
Different shares of the sub-industries in value added are respon sible for
changes at country level (cf. Appendix Figures 4-8). Overall, the relative
specialisation of the CEE is still much stronger in C26 (products) with on
average lower added value than in C27 (equipment) compared to the
Mediterranean countries.
9. Employment
Developments in employment reinforce the above-described changes –
at least until 2008, the latest year for which comparable data from
Eurostat are available. According to these, total European employment
in the two electronics sub-industries declined by 10% between 2000 and
2008. All four Visegrad countries belonged to the EU Member States16
which gained at least half a percentage point in terms of their shares in
EU electronics employment. Germany and Romania were the other two
members of the ‘gaining club’. By contrast, Ireland, France, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom each lost more than 0.5 percentage
points.
10. Developments in net exports
It is interesting to see to what extent changes in the share of European
production and value added are attributable to the activities of local
and/or locally-owned companies. Statistics on the interna tion ally
competitive part of production, i.e. that which is exported, may give an
indication of local content. However, ‘…conventional trade statistics are
a poor guide to bilateral export exposures for supply chain countries’ (IMF
2013: 13). As a result, the OECD-WTO data on trade in value added are
used.17 Unfortunately, these are calculated separately solely for C26
(products) and not for C27 (equipment). This database gives an indication
of the extent to which the analysed countries are integrated into
electronics global value chains and of the role of foreign-owned companies
(and imported inputs) in the exports of a given country. Unfortunately,
2009 is the latest year for which data are available.
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16. Estonia gained only 0.15 percentage points, reaching a 0.4 % share in total EU electronics
employment – due to its small size.
17. http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TIVA_OECD_WTO#
In a previous analysis using this database, the IMF (2013) noted for
manufacturing exports as a whole that the Visegrad countries’ bilateral
exposure to final demand in Germany was at a much lower level than
indicated by ‘traditional’ trade statistics, and thus their exposure to
European and world trade was at a much higher level. This indicates the
importance of non-German companies in integrating CEE countries in
GVCs as well as the high export intensity of German electronics produc -
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Figure 8 Country breakdown of EU electronics employment,
2000 and 2008 (%)
Note: used for 2000 due to a lack of data for Estonia 2001, Greece 2003, Latvia 2002, Malta 2001, Poland
2002, Slovenia 2002; for 2008: 2007 data for Greece, Spain, France, Latvia, Malta, UK, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia,
Luxemburg, Malta not included (due to missing or very low data – below 10000).
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat 
tion. Furthermore, the analysis showed the evolution of revealed compar -
ative advantages (RCA) of the Visegrad countries, Germany and the
Mediterranean countries, indicating a substantial shift between 1995 and
2009 (Rahman and Zhao 2013). There is a clear RCA shift away from
labour-intensive towards capital- and knowledge-intensive manufac tur -
ing in the Visegrad countries, while maintaining their advantage in labour-
and capital-intensive industries.18 This may indicate upgrading shifts in
the role of the CEE countries in the European distribution of activities.
Changes are less straightforward in the Mediterranean countries, as Spain
lost its RCA in knowledge-intensive activities, maintaining it only in
capital-intensive ones; Greece had lost its RCA in all activities by 2009,
while Portugal’s large RCA in labour-intensive activities was still there,
though with a smaller magnitude, in 2009, while its RCA in capital-
intensive manufacturing operations was slowly increasing. 
Comparing data for a pre-crisis (2005) and the latest available year
(2009), it is clear that the share of foreign value added embodied in gross
exports is relatively high in the analysed country group, ranging from
28% (Spain) to 63% (Czechia) in 2009 (cf. Figure 9). Overall, this ratio
in 2009 was still considerably higher in the CEE countries than in the
Magdolna Sass
282 Foreign investment in eastern and southern Europe
18. Hungary had RCA in knowledge-intensive activities only.
Figure 9 Foreign and domestic value added as reflected by the gross exports
of the analysed countries, 2005 and 2009 (USD million) 
Source: author’s calculations using basic decomposition of OECD gross export data
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Mediterranean countries. While in all countries there was an increase in
the absolute values of domestically produced parts between 2005 and
2009, in 2009 in Czechia, in Hungary, in Slovakia and in Portugal more
than half of gross exports was not produced locally. However, the share
of foreign value added content of gross exports declined in all the
countries, except for Czechia, Greece and Portugal. Thus while there were
signs of growing local value added during the crisis, the analysed
countries’ participation in ICT trade was still very much dependent on
imported inputs.
11. Outward FDI (OFDI) and relocations in the
electronics industry in the analysed countries
While much less important than inward FDI and inward relocations,
OFDI and outward relocations are also to be found in the countries
analysed. The restructuring of the division of labour in electronics are
part of an ongoing process which gained in momentum during the crisis
period as a result of growing competitive pressure on companies,
inducing them to find further ways to reduce costs. One way to do this is
to transfer activities to locations where they can be carried out more
efficiently and/or at considerably lower costs. Against this background,
one could expect increased relocation activity during the crisis. While the
CEE countries were still net receivers in this process, there were a few
relocations in the other direction.
As already seen, the sector is usually dominated by the subsidiaries of
large foreign multinational companies, with only a few indigenous firms.
We could thus expect relatively low OFDI by indigenous firms due to their
relative weakness, while indirect OFDI by foreign-owned subsidiaries of
multinationals could be more substantial.19 According to the data, OFDI
stock in electronics has been negligible, with the exception of Hungary
and Poland and to a certain extent Greece (Table 4).
Further data reveal that the most important host countries in the case of
Hungary are Slovakia and Brazil, and in the case of Poland various
developed European countries (France, Germany, UK) and developed
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19. Data should be analysed with care, as closures of foreign affiliates appear in FDI (and not in
OFDI) statistics as a negative number. However, when a local affiliate is the parent of a
foreign investment (the so-called indirect OFDI), it is recorded on the OFDI side.
countries outside Europe (in North America, and in Asia, notably
Singapore). For Greece, the most important host country is Romania.20
There are signs that resident firms, including a few indigenous local firms,
are attempting to enhance their productivity and competitiveness through
relocating the most labour-intensive activities to neighbouring or
geographically close countries with lower wages, i.e. realising efficiency-
seeking investments. On the other hand, the strategy of certain indigenous
and highly competitive companies includes OFDI to developed countries,
where they are acquiring existing brands, patents, etc. or simply being
much closer either to the innovative centres of the given segment of the
industry (thus investing with a strategic asset-seeking motive) or to their
(potential) customers (market-seeking motive) or both. 
The most obvious example for relocations is the case of the Hungarian
Videoton (see Box 2). Other such companies from Poland are TelForceOne
operating in wholesale trade and consumer electronics, with subsidiaries
in Czechia, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine; Relpol, a manufacturer of
electromagnetic products with two production plants abroad (in Ukraine
and Lithuania) and several distribution-oriented subsidiaries in other
European countries; and Apator, a producer of metering and switchgear
with six foreign subsidiaries in Russia, Germany, Czechia, Ukraine and
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20. This may refer to ICME ECAB S.A., a company producing power, telecommunications and
data transmission cables. See http://www.cablel.ro/index_en.php. ICME ECAB is one of the
largest cable producers in Romania. The company had over 490 employees and sales of EUR
88 million in 2009. ICME ECAB is part of the Greek group Hellenic Cables. See
http://www.romania-insider.com/greek-money-fuel-romanian-companies/27544/
Table 4 Direct investment position abroad in C26 (products), EUR million
EU-27
Czechia
Estonia
Greece
Spain
Hungary
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
2008
194,369
1
2
32
:
388
:
:
2
2009
191,009
2
-1
32
:
473
:
:
1
2010
207,472
3
2
32
:
502
847
:
1
2011
421,791
2
1
32
:
563
836
:
0
2012
:
5
:
:
:
:
:
:
Source: Eurostat, EU direct investment positions, breakdown by country and economic activity (NACE Rev. 2)
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Box 2 Videoton
Videoton is a large-sized Hungarian-owned electronic manufacturing services (EMS)
provider, which now belongs to the largest regional players, supplying European, US and
Japanese electronics and automotive companies. It supplies, among others, Robert Bosch,
Continental, Delphi, Luk, Suzuki and Visteon in the automotive sector and ABB, Braun,
Electrolux, Legrand, Panasonic, Philips, Siemens, Stadler, Schneider Electric in electronics.
It is the fourth largest European EMS. Based on its own traditional technologies and
competencies and close cooperation with its partners, the company manufactures parts,
sub-assemblies and modules in electronics, plastics and machinery. Videoton provides a
wide range of products for the automotive, consumer electronics, household appliances,
IT, office equipment and telecommunication industries. 
Its predecessor was established back in 1938. It became a major state-owned company in
the 1980s, employing 18 000 people. After the collapse of its regional markets it was
bought by three Hungarian individuals in the framework of privatisation in 1992.The
company group at present employs more than 7300 employees, out of which more than
1200 work in the foreign subsidiaries. Its revenues amounted to more than 300 million
euros (more than 380 million USD) in 2011. With regard to its production operations,
besides producing electronics and automotive products, the company also produces related
metal and plastic products. It also provides various services to its customers, such as
engineering, supply chain management, back-end technologies, logistics etc. The company’s
headquarters are located in Székesfehérvár, though it has eleven locations in and outside
Hungary. It is a group of at least twenty companies linked to each other through various
direct and indirect equity holdings. 
As for its foreign subsidiaries, Videoton acquired 98% of the shares of a Bulgarian firm in
Stara Zagora in 1999. It established a joint venture with a Ukrainian company, Tochpribor,
in 2009 in Mukachevo. Moreover, it owns a Bulgarian holding company located in the
capital, Sofia. Wages in both countries were and still are substantially lower than in
Hungary. As a response to pressure to increase wages in Hungary, the company transferred
its most labour-intensive activities to these foreign subsidiaries, explaining why it is
considered as one of the few examples of efficiency-seeking outward investors in Hungary. 
Sources: http://www.videoton.hu/downloads/videoton_general_eng.pdf,
balance sheets of the company and Radosevic and Yoruk (2001)
the United Kingdom21 (Kaliszuk and Wancio 2013). The case of Apator, a
company which has invested in developed ‘old’ EU Member States as well,
points to the second type of strategy, i.e. being closer to (potential)
customers and to the innovative centres of the segment.
On the other hand, there are a few cases of local subsidiaries of foreign
multinationals investing abroad. For example the Hungarian subsidiary
of the Korean firm, Samsung, is the parent company of a Slovakian and
a Czech subsidiary and of one Romanian branch. The electronics OFDI
of Hungary in Brazil can be attributed to a Hungarian Foxconn
subsidiary, FIH Europe. Nevertheless, overall inward FDI still dwarfs
OFDI in the CEE electronics sector, in terms of both its value and the
number of projects.
12. Conclusion
CEE countries have become important locations for the global and
especially for the European electronics industry, due to an FDI-based
shift in the global and especially European division of labour and
capacities. Local subsidiaries of foreign-owned multinational companies
are the most important players in the industry. Given the higher than
average manufacturing sensitivity of the industry to business cycles, we
suspected that major changes occurred during the crisis. We were only
able to partially document this due to missing data and data problems.
This forced us to rely on multiple data sources for direct or indirect
information on the industry. According to this, the share of the five CEE
countries in EU27 electronics FDI is still relatively low, probably
indicating that the activities transferred here are relatively footloose due
to low invested amounts and thus low sunk costs. Furthermore, foreign-
owned companies were able to further increase their shares in
employment, production, value added and R&D during the crisis,
indicating that the crisis negatively affected locally-owned companies
much more. Output data of electronics show that, after a decline during
the crisis, the CEE countries were able to restore their pre-crisis
momentum, while the Mediterranean countries were characterised by
stagnation or decline. Interestingly enough, the stagnation of the
Mediterranean countries went hand-in-hand with an increase in
electronics activities not only in the analysed CEE countries but also –
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21. http://www.apator.com/uploads/files/consolidated-report-2012.pdf
and even more - in certain ‘old’ EU Member States, especially Germany
and Austria. The during-crisis gains by these ‘old’ EU Member States
were much larger (in % points) than those of the CEE countries. Thus the
crisis induced a redistribution of electronics activities among EU
countries based on their levels of competitiveness. The magnitude of the
changes in electronics value added is smaller compared to that of output.
However, the two sub-industries differ significantly: overall, the relative
specialisation of CEE countries is still much stronger in C26 (products)
with on average lower value added than in C27 (equipment) compared to
the Mediterranean countries. Different industry mixes per country and
different relative specialisations may thus be responsible for differences
in changes at country level. The average share of foreign value added was
still higher in the CEE in 2009 than in the Mediterranean countries,
indicating a higher reliance on imported inputs, and indirectly, a
presumably higher share of assembly and/or lower value added activities.
While new capacities have been created in the CEE countries, relocations
from other, mainly Western European countries were also responsible
for these changes. On the other side of the coin, it is interesting to note
that the ongoing restructuring of the European electronics industry
resulted in OFDI and relocations away from the CEE countries, though
their extent is of course much smaller compared to incoming FDI. It is
also interesting to see the emergence of indigenous multinational
electronics companies from the region, especially from Poland and
Hungary, indicating their increasing level of competitiveness. 
As for the future, it is important to note that among the ‘old’ EU Member
States there is a clear divergence in terms of the size of the electronics
capacities they host, a process which seems to have accelerated during
the crisis. Besides wage competitiveness, other factors influencing
national and regional competitiveness are playing an increasing role in
determining the location of electronics capacities, and we were unable to
rule out an emerging home-country bias, especially during the crisis
years. These factors will certainly affect further developments in the CEE
countries. On the one hand, assuming the continuation of the during- and
after-crisis trends, a further steady increase in the importance of the
analysed CEE countries can be expected in European electronics
production, as they host major capacities and there is evidence of capacity
upgrading. Reflecting relative wage increases, the CEE countries may
thus climb slowly up the added-value ladder, partly due the most labour-
intensive activities being relocated to lower-wage European and
non-European locations and partly due to further relocations of higher
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added-value activities there, including some R&D. On the other hand, in
connection with developments in the EU-15, differences between
individual countries with different levels of competitiveness in the various
electronics activities may cause further divergence in terms of their roles
in the European division of electronics activities. 
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Figure 1 Output of Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
(C26) in the analysed countries, 2000-2012, (million euros)
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Figure 2 Output of Electrical equipment (C27) in the analysed countries,
2000-2012, (million euros) 
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat national accounts data (NACE classification) 
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Figure 3 Share of the analysed countries in the EU27 output of Manufacture
of computer, electronic and optical products (C26), 2000-2012 (%)
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Figure 4 Share of the analysed countries in the EU27 output of Electrical
equipment (C27), 2000-2012 (%)
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat national accounts data (NACE classification)
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Figure 5 Gross value-added of Manufacture of computer, electronic and
optical products (C26) in the analysed countries, 2000-2012,
(million euros)
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Figure 6 Gross value-added of Electrical equipment (C27) in the analysed
countries, 2000-2012, (million euros)
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat national accounts data (NACE classification)
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Figure 7 Share of the analysed countries in the EU27 gross value-added of
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products (C26),
2000-2012 (%)
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Figure 8 Share of the analysed countries in the EU27gross value-added of
Electrical equipment (C27), 2000-2012 (%)
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat national accounts data (NACE classification)
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